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Abstract
We consider a network of banks that optimally choose a strategy of asset liquidations and
borrowing in order to cover short term obligations. The borrowing is done in the form of
collateralized repurchase agreements, the haircut level of which depends on the total liquidations
of all the banks. Similarly the fire-sale price of the asset obtained by each of the banks depends
on the amount of assets liquidated by the bank itself and by other banks. By nature of this
setup, banks’ behavior is considered as a Nash equilibrium. This paper provides two forms for
market clearing to occur: through a common closing price and through an application of the
limit order book. The main results of this work are providing sufficient conditions for existence
and uniqueness of the clearing solutions (i.e., liquidations, borrowing, fire sale prices, and haircut
levels).
Keywords Systemic Risk, Price-Mediated Contagion, Repurchase Agreements.
1 Introduction
Historically, financial risk was typically measured for individual firms separately. After the financial
crisis of 2007-2009, a new understanding that risk can spread through the entire financial system
has emerged. This is referred to as systemic risk – the risk that the distress of several banks can
spread throughout the system to a degree that it may affect the viability of the entire system or
a significant part of it. Such a propagation of risk is known as financial contagion. Two types of
contagion are usually distinguished: those that happen due to local connections (e.g., obligations
between banks in the network), and those that happen due to their influence on the entire network
(e.g., impact to asset prices). This study focuses on a form of global contagion through asset
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prices, and investigates the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in a model of fire sales
and collateralized borrowing.
A seminal paper in the systemic risk literature is Eisenberg and Noe [2001]; that work studied
an equilibrium payment model in a network of banks. That network model of interbank payments
has been applied in numerous follow-up studies, e.g., Anand et al. [2015], Halaj and Kok [2015],
Boss et al. [2004], Elsinger et al. [2013], Upper [2011], Gai et al. [2011], Bardoscia et al. [2017]. The
Eisenberg and Noe [2001] model has also been extended to consider bankruptcy costs and asset fire
sale dynamics (see Elsinger [2009], Rogers and Veraart [2013], Elliott et al. [2014], Glasserman and
Young [2015], Weber and Weske [2017], Capponi et al. [2016], Elsinger [2009], Elliott et al. [2014],
Weber and Weske [2017], Gourie´roux et al. [2012], Cifuentes et al. [2005], Nier et al. [2007], Gai
and Kapadia [2010], Amini et al. [2013], Chen et al. [2016], Weber and Weske [2017], Amini et al.
[2016], Feinstein [2017], Feinstein and El-Masri [2017], Feinstein [2019]). We refer to, e.g., Weber
and Weske [2017], Staum [2013], Hu¨ser [2015] for detailed review of this literature.
In this paper we extend the model of Bichuch and Feinstein [2019]; that work considered a
network of banks facing shortfalls on their obligations which can be met through borrowing or by
liquidating assets. The primary goal of this current paper is to consider the effects of repurchase
agreement (repo) markets on financial stability. Such markets require banks to post collateral above
the value of the loan in order to secure short term financing. In this construction, each bank seeks
to optimize their strategy between asset liquidations and borrowing in the repo market. As in the
traditional fire sale literature (see, e.g., Amini et al. [2016]), asset liquidations cause price impacts
and, thus, the actions of one bank influence the decisions of all other institutions as well, i.e., we
consider the Nash equilibrium of strategies. Based on the static setting traditionally followed in
the literature, we assume that all the trading happens simultaneously and instantaneously.
Previously, prices were provided by an inverse demand function which was used to price liqui-
dations as well as provide mark-to-market accounting. In undertaking this study, we consider two
classical and realistic pricing functions in the fire sale process: Volume Weighted Average Pricing
(VWAP) and a Limit Order Book (LOB) based pricing scheme. Both of these schemes can be
viewed as pricing limits as order sizes decrease to zero, but with different rates of liquidation. This
allows us to incorporate notions of time dynamics into the static model proposed. The VWAP
scheme determines prices if firms place orders at a rate proportional to their total desired liquida-
tions; this, ultimately, results in the same average price for every bank. Such a pricing scheme was
introduced in Banerjee and Feinstein [2019]. The LOB setting distinguishes prices by assuming all
firms place orders at the same speed; banks with smaller order volumes will receive a higher price
than those with a larger order volume (as the latter will continue to eat through the book even
after the former are done liquidating).
As highlighted above, the innovation of this work is two-fold. First, we consider realistic pricing
schemes that allow for banks to receive different prices based on the quantity of assets sold instead
of the, more standard, assumption that there is a unique price at which all transactions occur.
Second, we consider collateralized borrowing of illiquid assets in a repo market in which the haircut
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of this collateral also depends on the mark-to-market value of the asset. As opposed to the realized
liquidation prices, the haircut remains bank independent and only depends on the entire sale
volume of the entire banking system since the deal depends on the value of the collateralized
asset rather than the riskiness of the individual banks. Under these constructions, we are able to
investigate the sensitivity of the resulting market prices to the prevailing repo interest rate. In
particular, regulators use interest rates as the primary control for financial stability. This was
seen in the emergency liquidity injection by the Federal Reserve in September 2019, in order to
stabilize the repo market Ihrig et al. [2020], Afonso et al. [2020]. In fact, Gorton and Metrick
[2012], Brunnermeier [2009] consider the 2007-2009 financial crisis as a run on the repo market.
Therefore systematic consideration of repo markets and the impact of interest rates is of paramount
importance.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model with general
inverse demand pricing functions. In that section we provide the existence of Nash equilibrium under
a minimal set of assumptions. Section 3 introduces the VWAP and LOB based inverse demand
pricing functions and discusses the conditions needed for maximal clearing solutions and uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium. Numerical case studies and comparison of VWAP and LOB inverse demand
pricing functions is in Section 4. The proofs for the main results are provided in the Appendix.
Additionally in the Appendix, under the uniqueness conditions, we investigate the sensitivity of
the clearing solutions to the prevailing repo rate.
2 Financial setting
We begin by assuming a system of n banks. In contrast to works that explicitly depend on the
network of interbank obligations, e.g., in Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Cifuentes et al. [2005], Amini
et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017], herein we will consider only fire sale effects and price mediated
contagion as in, e.g., Greenwood et al. [2015], Braouezec and Wagalath [2018, 2019], Feinstein
[2020], Banerjee and Feinstein [2019]. We will, for simplicity, assume that all the banks i = 1, ..., n
are facing a (cash) shortfall hi > 0, all while holding ai > 0 shares of illiquid assets; any banks
without either a shortfall or illiquid asset holdings will not participate in any fire sale or borrowing
and thus are extraneous to the considerations of this model. The banks are faced with the task
of finding the optimal strategy to raise hi cash in order to cover this shortfall. We assume that
they can do so by either selling their illiquid asset, borrowing, or both. It will be assumed that the
borrowing is going to be collateralized using the same illiquid asset. As is standard in the literature,
due to the illiquidity, the price of the illiquid asset declines as assets are being sold; this is due to
supply-demand dynamics so that the equilibrium is maintained. The same effect is assumed for the
collateral value of the asset.
Herein we introduce two “pricing” functions. Let f¯i : R
n
+ → [0, 1] denote the average price
obtained by bank i = 1, ..., n given the set of system liquidations (s1, ..., sn) ∈ D :=
∏n
j=1[0, aj ].
Note that we implicitly impose a no short selling constraint throughout this work. Here, without
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loss of generality, it was assumed that the current, highest price of the asset, before any sales
happened is 1, and it can only decrease thereafter. Notably, the construction of f¯i implies that
different banks may obtain different prices in the market due to the market design or different order
sizes. Let g : R+ → [0, 1] denote the price of the collateralized asset in the repurchase agreements
under study, i.e., the function g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
encodes the haircut on the asset as a mapping of the
total liquidations by all the banks. Note that while the price obtained by bank i may be unique due
to the different quantities different banks are selling, since the repo transaction is collateralized it
is assumed that the repo market offers the same repo rate r to all banks and uses the same haircut
g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
. Though we call g the “haircut”, it is more appropriate to denote 1− g to be the true
haircut on the asset in the repo market. At various times in this work we will refer to g as the
haircut and others 1− g will be given that name.
Assuming banks sell s := (s1, ..., sn) ∈ D, the realized loss to bank i from the sale is si(1− f¯i(s)).
The bank obtained sif¯i(s) through this sale, therefore it needs to borrow an additional (hi−sif¯i(s))
for the cost of r(hi − sif¯i(s)). We will abuse notation and denote for convenience f¯i to be both
f¯i(si, s−i) and f¯i(s). Therefore, bank i seeks to optimize:
s∗i = s
∗
i (s−i) = argmin
si∈[0,ai]
si
(
1− f¯i(si, s−i)
)
+ r
(
hi − sif¯i(si, s−i)
)
s.t. si ≤ hi
f¯i(si, s−i)
, si ≥
hi − aig
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
f¯i(si, s−i)− g
(∑n
j=1 sj
) . (2.1)
Here, the first inequality ensures that bank i does not obtain more than hi through the asset sale,
and the second inequality constraint is used to ensure that hi−sif¯i(si, s−i) ≤ (ai−si)g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
,
i.e., after the sale, bank i has enough collateral (ai − si)g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
to cover its loan. The paper
of Bichuch and Feinstein [2019] considers the case in which no haircut is taken, i.e., g ≡ 1.
In (2.1), it follows that bank i is solvent if and only if
hi − aig
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
f¯i(si, s−i)− g
(∑n
j=1 sj
) ≤ hi
f¯i(si, s−i)
≤ ai.
By construction of the haircut for repurchase agreements 0 ≤ g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
< f¯i(si, s−i). Under
such a construction bank i is solvent if and only if hi ≤ aif¯i(si, s−i), i.e., if at the current price
realized by bank i it is possible for said bank to cover its shortfall by liquidations alone. If bank i
is insolvent then we will assume that it is forced to liquidate all of its asset holdings, i.e., s∗i = ai.
For convenience, for the remainder of this work, denote q¯i = f¯i(si, s−i), i = 1, ..., n, and
q = g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
. With this notation, we modify (2.1) (similarly as in Bichuch and Feinstein
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[2019]) such that we seek a Nash equilibrium of the game for each bank i
s∗i = s
∗
i (s−i, q, q¯) = argmin
si∈[0,ai]
si
(
1− f¯i(si, s−i)
)
+ r
(
hi − sif¯i(si, s−i)
)
(2.2)
s.t. si ≤ hi
q¯i
, si ≥ hi − aiq
q¯i − q .
The goal is then to find a Nash equilibrium for (2.2), such that (q, q¯) are, additionally, fixed points
of
q = g
 n∑
j=1
s∗j
 , q¯i = f¯i(s∗).
As noted above, bank i is defaulting if hi ≥ aiq¯i and, in such a situation, s∗i = ai. Our goal is
primarily to find conditions for existence and uniqueness of this Nash game in the financial system.
In order to do that we need assumptions on the inverse demand functions f¯i and g.
Assumption 2.1. Let M ≥∑ni=1 ai be the total initial market capitalization of the illiquid asset.
For i = 1, ..., n we assume that f¯i : R
n
+ → [0, 1] are each continuous and strictly decreasing in
every argument with f¯i(0, ..., 0) = 1 and f¯i(a1, ..., an) > 0. Additionally, for i = 1, ..., n and
s−i ∈
∏n
j=1,j 6=1[0, aj ] we assume that si 7→ sif¯i(s, s−i) is concave.
The haircut function g : R+ → [0, 1] is continuous and strictly decreasing, with min1≤i≤n f¯i(s) >
g
(∑n
j=1 sj
)
for every s ∈ D.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium easily follows as a consequence of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem:
Theorem 2.2 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium). Assume the inverse demand functions f¯i, i =
1, ..., n and haircut function g satisfy Assumption 2.1. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium liquidat-
ing strategy s∗∗ ∈ D with equilibrium prices (q∗∗, q¯∗∗1 , ..., q¯∗∗n ) =
(
g (
∑n
i=1 s
∗∗
i ) , f¯1 (s
∗∗) , ..., f¯n (s∗∗)
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Fix bank i and consider (2.2) as a function of (s−i, q, q¯i) such that 0 ≤ q < q¯i,
with f¯i(a1, ..., an) ≤ q¯i, and s∗−i ∈
∏n
j=1, 6=i[0, aj ]. Since the objective function of (2.2) is convex in
si and the constraint set is a convex interval, the set of minimizers for a fixed set of parameters
(s−i, q, q¯i) is convex. An application of Berge maximum theorem (on q¯i ≥ hiai due to the continuity
of the objective and constraint functions) yields upper continuity and convex-valuedness of the set
of maximizers. This is extended for the region of insolvency by the assumption that s∗i = ai on
hi > aiq¯i. Thus a joint equilibrium (s
∗∗, q∗∗, q¯∗∗1 , ..., q¯
∗∗
n ) can be found via Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem.
It turns out that the conditions for existence of equilibrium are very mild, compared to the
uniqueness conditions. This is not surprising considering the following example.
Example 2.3. Consider an n = 1 bank setting with r = 0 repo rate. This bank has assets and
shortfall so that a1f¯1(a1) < h1 < a1g(0). Therefore, two possible solutions exist:
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1. If the bank liquidates no assets then (q∗∗, q¯∗∗1 , s
∗∗
1 ) = (g(0), 1, 0) is an equilibrium solution;
2. If the bank defaults and liquidates all its assets then (q∗∗, q¯∗∗1 , s
∗∗
1 ) = (g(a1), f¯1(a1), a1) is an
equilibrium solution.
We now concentrate our efforts into understanding properties of these equilibria and find con-
ditions to guarantee their uniqueness. In what follows we will concentrate on two examples for the
inverse demand functions f¯i, i = 1, ..., n.
3 Main results
We now concentrate our efforts into understanding when the above equilibrium is unique. In what
follows we will concentrate on two sample functions. However, instead of specifying the inverse
demand functions f¯i directly, we derive them from a density function of limit order book together
with some trading rules. Let this density be given by f : R+ → [0, 1]. Alternatively, this f can be
viewed as a the price of the next infinitely small trade. We concentrate on two realistic examples
of price constructions given the liquidations, i.e., market rules, to construct the price of the trade
with functional forms f¯i : R
n
+ → [0, 1] which provides the average price obtained by firm i given
the set of system liquidations.
1. Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP): For i = 1, ..., n set f¯i(s) :=
∫
∑n
j=1 sj
0 f(σ)dσ∑n
j=1 sj
.
Note that in this case f¯i(s) = f¯j(s) for i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
2. Limit Order Book Based Price (LOB): For i = 1, ..., n set
f¯i(s) :=
1
si
k∑
j=1
1
n− (j − 1)
∫ ∑j
l=1(n−(l−1))(s[l]−s[l−1])
∑j−1
l=1 (n−(l−1))(s[l]−s[l−1])
f(σ)dσ,
where 0 =: s[0] ≤ s[1] ≤ s[2] ≤ ... ≤ s[n] are the order statistics and si = s[k].
Note that the VWAP example corresponds to how some exchanges calculate the closing price
(e.g., in Mexico, India and Saudi Arabia1). Therefore, given our assumption that this is an illiquid
asset, this is a good representation of price paid by banks given the amounts of trades they (collec-
tively) want to make. Whereas the LOB example is an example of how to price market trades all
coming at the same time using an existing limit order trades already in the book. This is a very
interesting and novel example, as in this case, different banks pay different prices. As far as the
authors are aware, this LOB construction has never previously been formulated.
Alternatively, these specific pricing functionals can be viewed as a limit as order sizes decrease
to zero at different rates. VWAP can be viewed as the limit when all banks submit their orders at
a rate proportional to the total desired liquidation; as such, every bank finishes trading at the same
“time” and thus all banks obtain the same average price. In contrast, the LOB is the limit when
1research.ftserussell.com/products/downloads/Closing_Prices_Used_For_Index_Calculation.pdf
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all banks submit their orders at the same rate; as such, banks finish their transactions at different
times based on the desired quantity of assets to be liquidated which generates heterogeneous prices
for different trading strategies. Therefore, though this model is static, these constructions allow us
to approximate simple time dynamics.
The following assumptions are placed on the order book density function f :
Assumption 3.1. Let M ≥∑ni=1 ai be the total initial market capitalization of the illiquid asset.
The order book density function f : R+ → [0, 1] is strictly decreasing and twice continuously differ-
entiable, with f(0) = 1 and f(s) > 0 for any s ∈ [0,M ]. Additionally it will be assumed that the
first derivative f ′ : R+ → −R+ is nondecreasing.
Throughout the remainder of this work we often wish to consider a comparison of vectors of
(q, q¯); this is accomplished in the usual way, i.e., (q1, q¯1) ≥ (q2, q¯2) if and only if q1 ≥ q2 and
q¯1i ≥ q¯2i for every i = 1, ..., n.
Our next goal is to ultimately establish uniqueness-type properties of the Nash equilibrium.
In order to do so, similarly to Bichuch and Feinstein [2019], we consider the problem with fixed
liquidation price(s) and the haircut value as described in (2.2). As opposed to Theorem 2.2 above,
we first show that there exist unique Nash equilibrium liquidations for these fixed prices as shown
in Proposition 3.2 below, the proof of which is delayed until Appendix A.1.
Proposition 3.2. Let Q̂ := {(q, q¯) ∈ (0, 1] × (0, 1]n | q < q¯i ∀i = 1, 2, ..., n}. Under VWAP or LOB
structure and Assumption 3.1, given (q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) ∈ Q̂ there exists a unique set of equilibrium
liquidations s¯(q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) = s
∗(s¯(q, q¯1, ..., q¯n), q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) to (2.2).
From Example 2.3 it is clear the that uniqueness of the equilibrium does not hold without further
assumptions, but we can show, as done in Theorem 3.3, that the set of all fixed points prices (q∗, q¯∗)
in the Nash equilibrium of (2.2) is a lattice under a VWAP pricing scheme; notably, as demonstrated
below in Example 3.4, the LOB pricing scheme does not satisfy the typical conditions for this result.
The proof of the theorem is presented in the Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3.3. Under the VWAP structure and Assumption 3.1, the set of clearing haircuts and
prices is a lattice; in particular, there exists a greatest and least clearing haircut and set of clearing
prices: (q↑, q¯↑1 , ..., q¯
↑
n) ≥ (q↓, q¯↓1 , ..., q¯↓n).
Sketch of proof. Taking advantage of Proposition 3.2, we find that the sum
∑n
i=1 s¯i is monotonic
in (q, q¯1, ..., q¯n). Therefore we apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem. The details are provided in
Appendix A.2.
Importantly, Theorem 3.3 is not applied to the LOB structure. To demonstrate the lack of such
a result for the LOB, we present here a counterexample to the monotonicity property utilized in
the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Example 3.4. Consider an n = 2 bank system with r = 5% repo rate. Let bank 1 have shortfall
h1 = 1.98 and a1 = 10 assets. Let bank 2 have shortfall h2 = 5 and a2 = 10 assets. Consider
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a linear order density function f(s) = 1 − 0.0095s and haircut function g(s) = 0.9 − 0.0095s.
We then consider two possible inputs to the clearing system (q1, q¯1) := (0.9, (1, 1)) and (q2, q¯2) :=
(0.9, (0.99, 0.98)).
1. Under initial prices of (q1, q¯1), the banks sell s¯(q1, q¯1) = (1.98, 3.02) assets each. This results
in LOB based prices of q¯1,†1 := 0.9811 and q¯
1,†
2 := 0.9729 for banks 1 and 2 respectively. The
resulting haircut is q1,† := 0.8524.
2. Under initial prices of (q2, q¯2), the banks sell s¯(q2, q¯2) = (2, 3) assets each. This results in
LOB based prices of q¯2,†1 := 0.9810 and q¯
2,†
2 := 0.9730 for banks 1 and 2 respectively. The
resulting haircut is q2,† := 0.8524.
Notably, though (q1, q¯1) ≥ (q2, q¯2), this monotonicity does not hold for the resulting prices as
(q1,†, q¯1,†) 6≥ (q2,†, q¯2,†).
Finally, we introduce additional assumptions and establish uniqueness of the equilibrium in
Theorem 3.6 below, the proof of which is delayed until the Appendix A.3. For such a result we
introduce a simplified notation, let ∂x :=
∂
∂x
denote the partial derivative operator with respect to
some variable x.
Definition 3.5. We will say that bank i ∈ {1, ..., n} is fundamentally solvent if it is able to cover
its shortfall in any case, that is if hi ≤ aif¯i(a), where a = (a1, ..., an)⊤.
Remark 1. If bank i is fundamentally solvent then there is a feasible solution to the maximization
problem (2.2), provided (q, q¯) = (g(
∑n
i=1 si), f¯(s)) for some s ∈ D, since the feasible region is
non-empty. Indeed,
1. hi
q¯i
≤ ai if and only if hi ≤ aiq¯i.
2. hi−aiq
q¯i−q ≤ ai if and only if hi ≤ aiq¯i.
3. hi−aiq
q¯i−q ≤
hi
q¯i
if and only if hi ≤ aiq¯i.
Theorem 3.6. Assume all banks are fundamentally solvent. Under VWAP or LOB structure and
Assumption 3.1, if additionally, −cM (minj,k ∂sk f¯j(0n) ∧ g′(0)) < minjmins∈D (f¯j(s)− g(∑ni=1 si))
with c = 3 and c = n in case of VWAP and LOB, respectively, then there exists a unique clearing
haircut and set of actualized prices (q∗, q¯∗).
Sketch of proof. The proof follows from the Banach fixed point theorem and is presented in Ap-
pendix A.3.
Remark 2. At this point we wish to recall Example 2.3 which highlights a case of non-uniqueness
of the clearing solution. In that single bank setting, the bank is not fundamentally solvent since, by
construction, a1f¯1(a1) < h1. This highlights the importance of the assumption that all banks are
fundamentally solvent in Theorem 3.6 for the uniqueness of the clearing prices.
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Remark 3. With the consideration of existence and uniqueness of the clearing solution, the sensi-
tivity of the equilibrium liquidations and prices to the repo rate r is of great interest. This is studied
mathematically in Appendix B. Intuitively, we expect that as the repo rate rises, and borrowing
becomes more expensive the liquidation of the illiquid asset increase. It also follows from here that,
the higher the interest rate, the lower the terminal asset price. Alternatively, from a regulator’s
perspective, if the goal is to limit the extent of the fire sales, it can be achieved by controlling the
interest rates, as was done recently in September 2019, and was also used extensively during the
crisis (see Quinn et al. [2020] and Cecchetti [2009] respectively). We refer to the case studies in
Section 4 for visualizations of this notion.
4 Comparative statics
Before considering specific examples, we will first introduce a consideration for the computation
of the clearing prices (q, q¯) = (g(
∑n
i=1 s¯i(q, q¯)), f¯ (s¯(q, q¯))). This approach will always converge for
the VWAP setting due to Theorem 3.3; though the LOB setting does not satisfy monotonicity, this
algorithm converged for every choice of parameters attempted by the authors indicating a stronger
result than found thus far. Specifically, these are computed via Picard iterations beginning from
(q0, q¯0) := 1n+1. However, s¯(q, q¯) will require consideration for computation itself due to its game
theoretic construction. As provided in Proposition 3.2 these liquidations exist and are unique. In
fact, due to the construction of the problem as discussed in the proof of that proposition, we are able
to apply the algorithm provided in Rosen [1965]. This is summarized in Algorithm 2 of Bichuch and
Feinstein [2019] for the VWAP setting. We wish to note that in the LOB setting, the computation
can be improved significantly via an iterative approach of determining the banks liquidating the
fewest number of assets.
In this section we will consider two primary case studies. The first is a consideration of the
VWAP and LOB structures to determine their relative ordering, i.e., is one better than the other.
This is important from a mechanism design perspective as different markets consider the closing
price using different rule sets. The second case study we will consider is an implementation of
European banking data to determine the impacts of interest rates and haircut functions on the
clearing prices.
4.1 Mechanism design
In this first case study, we will investigate two networks in detail in order to show that some system
constructions find that VWAP has more total liquidations with less system-wide use of the repo
markets than LOB, while other constructions have the reverse ordering. In particular, we will first
consider a system of n identical banks and second a specific system of n = 2 banks only.
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4.1.1 Symmetric case study
Consider a system of n identical banks. Each of these banks has shortfall h > 0 and assets a > 0.
The prevailing repo rate is provided by r ∈ (0, 13). For the purposes of this example, consider the
order book density f(s) = 1 − αs and haircut function g(s) = 12 − αs for α ∈
(
2r
(1+r)(n+1)a ,
1
2na
)
;
notably these constructions satisfy Assumption 3.1 and taken so as to construct an example in
which firms have a choice of behavior. Consider now our two market mechanisms: VWAP and
LOB.
1. VWAP: By construction f¯i(s) := 1− α2
∑n
j=1 sj for every bank i in the VWAP construction.
Additionally, we take advantage of the symmetric setup to conclude that all banks should
follow the same strategy, i.e., sVWAP = sVWAP1n for some singleton s
VWAP ∈ [0, a] and
q¯VWAP = q¯VWAP1n for some singleton q¯
VWAP ∈ [0, 1]. Consider game (2.2) for fixed values
(q, q¯) with q < q¯:
s∗i (q, q¯1n) = argmin
si∈[0,a]
α2 (1 + r)
∑
j 6=i
s∗j(q, q¯1n) + si
 si + r(h− si) ∣∣∣∣ si ∈ [h− aqq¯ − q , hq¯
]
= argmin
si∈[0,a]
{
α
2
(1 + r)s2i +
[α
2
(1 + r)(n− 1)sVWAP (q, q¯)− r
]
si + rh
∣∣∣∣ si ∈ [h− aqq¯ − q , hq¯
]}
=
h− aq
q¯ − q ∨
[
r
(1 + r)α
− n− 1
2
sVWAP (q, q¯)
]
∧ h
q¯
,
if h < aq¯ (and sVWAP (q, q¯) = a if h ≥ aq¯). In particular, this provides a single fixed point
problem to find sVWAP (q, q¯), i.e.,
sVWAP (q, q¯) =
h− aq
q¯ − q ∨
[
r
(1 + r)α
− n− 1
2
sVWAP (q, q¯)
]
∧ h
q¯
,
⇒ sVWAP (q, q¯) = h− aq
q¯ − q ∨
[
2r
α(1 + r)(n+ 1)
]
∧ h
q¯
if h < aq¯. We wish to note that the existence of sVWAP (q, q¯) justifies our choice of sVWAP =
sVWAP1n as, due to Proposition 3.2, s
VWAP is unique and thus must equal sVWAP1n. Finally,
it remains to find the equilibrium prices (qVWAP , q¯VWAP ):
qVWAP =

−12 +
√
1− 2αnh if h ∈ HVWAP1 ,
1
2 − 2rn(1+r)(n+1) if h ∈ HVWAP2 ,
1− αna− 12
√
1 + 8αn(h− a) + 4(αna)2 if h ∈ HVWAP3 ,
1
2 − αna if h ∈ HVWAP4
,
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q¯VWAP =

1+
√
1−2αnh
2 if h ∈ HVWAP1 ,
1− rn(1+r)(n+1) if h ∈ HVWAP2
5
4 − αna2 − 14
√
1 + 8αn(h− a) + 4(αna)2 if h ∈ HVWAP3 ,
1− α2na if h ∈ HVWAP4 ,
with borrowing/liquidation regions
HVWAP1 =
[
0 ,
2r
α(1 + r)(n+ 1)
(
1− rn
(1 + r)(1 + n)
))
,
HVWAP2 =
[
2r
α(1 + r)(n+ 1)
(
1− rn
(1 + r)(1 + n)
)
,
2r
α(1 + r)(n+ 1)
(
1
2
+
rn
(1 + r)(n+ 1)
)
+ a
(
1
2
− 2rn
(1 + r)(n+ 1)
))
,
HVWAP3 =
[
2r
α(1 + r)(n+ 1)
(
1
2
+
rn
(1 + r)(n+ 1)
)
+ a
(
1
2
− 2rn
(1 + r)(n+ 1)
)
, a
(
1− α
2
na
))
,
HVWAP4 =
[
a
(
1− α
2
na
)
, ∞
)
.
We wish to note that all square roots are well defined on the intervals on which they are
considered. Additionally, qVWAP and q¯VWAP are continuous in h; as such the closures of
the bounding intervals can be chosen arbitrarily. Though this setting does not satisfy the
uniqueness conditions of Theorem 3.6, the simplicity of the symmetric system still admits a
unique clearing solution.
2. LOB: By construction f¯[i](s) := 1 − α2s[i]
[∑i−1
k=1 s[k](2s[i] − s[k]) + (n− (i− 1))s2[i]
]
for every
bank [i] (i.e., the bank liquidating the ith most assets) in the LOB construction. Additionally,
we take advantage of the symmetric setup to conclude that all banks should follow the same
strategy, i.e., sLOB = sLOB1n for some singleton s
LOB ∈ [0, a] and q¯LOB = q¯LOB1n for some
singleton q¯LOB ∈ [0, 1]. Consider game (2.2) for fixed values (q, q¯) with q < q¯:
s∗i (q, q¯1n) = argmin
si∈[0,a]

α
2 (1 + r)
[
ns2i I{si≤sLOB(q,q¯)}
+((n− 1)sLOB(q, q¯)2 + 2(n− 1)sLOB(q, q¯)si + s2i )I{si>sLOB(q,q¯)}
]
+r(h− si)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ si ∈
[
h− aq
q¯ − q ,
h
q¯
]
=

h−aq
q¯−q ∨
[
r
α(1+r)n
]
∧ h
q¯
if r
α(1+r)n ≤ sLOB(q, q¯),
h−aq
q¯−q ∨
[
r
α(1+r) − (n− 1)sLOB(q, q¯)
]
∧ h
q¯
if r
α(1+r)n > s
LOB(q, q¯),
if h < aq¯ (and sLOB(q, q¯) = a if h ≥ aq¯). In particular, this provides a single fixed point
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problem to find sLOB(q, q¯), i.e., if h < aq¯
sLOB(q, q¯) =

h−aq
q¯−q ∨
[
r
α(1+r)n
]
∧ h
q¯
if r
α(1+r)n ≤ sLOB(q, q¯),
h−aq
q¯−q ∨
[
r
α(1+r) − (n− 1)sLOB(q, q¯)
]
∧ h
q¯
if r
α(1+r)n > s
LOB(q, q¯)
,
⇒ sLOB(q, q¯) = h− aq
q¯ − q ∨
[
r
α(1 + r)n
]
∧ h
q¯
as both provided cases result in the same fixed point. We wish to note that the existence of
sLOB(q, q¯) justifies our choice of sLOB = sLOB1n as, due to Proposition 3.2, s
LOB is unique
and thus must equal sLOB1n. Finally, it remains to find the equilibrium prices (q
LOB, q¯LOB):
qLOB =

−12 +
√
1− 2αnh if h ∈ HLOB1
1
2 − r1+r if h ∈ HLOB2
1− αna− 12
√
1 + 8αn(h− a) + 4(αna)2 if h ∈ HLOB3
1
2 − αna if h ∈ HLOB4
q¯LOB =

1+
√
1−2αnh
2 if h ∈ HLOB1 ,
1− r2(1+r) if h ∈ HLOB2 ,
5
4 − αna2 − 14
√
1 + 8αn(h− a) + 4(αna)2 if h ∈ HLOB3 ,
1− α2na if h ∈ HLOB4 ,
with borrowing/liquidation regions
HLOB1 =
[
0 ,
r
α(1 + r)n
(
1− r
2(1 + r)
))
,
HLOB2 =
[
r
α(1 + r)n
(
1− r
2(1 + r)
)
,
r
2α(1 + r)n
(
1 +
r
1 + r
)
+ a
(
1
2
− r
1 + r
))
,
HLOB3 =
[
r
2α(1 + r)n
(
1 +
r
1 + r
)
+ a
(
1
2
− r
1 + r
)
, a
(
1− α
2
na
))
,
HLOB4 =
[
a
(
1− α
2
na
)
, ∞
)
.
We wish to note that all square roots are well defined on the intervals on which they are
considered. Additionally, qVWAP and q¯VWAP are continuous in h; as such the closures of
the bounding intervals can be chosen arbitrarily. Though this setting does not satisfy the
uniqueness conditions of Theorem 3.6, the simplicity of the symmetric system still admits a
unique clearing solution.
Notably, sVWAP (q, q¯) ≥ sLOB(q, q¯) for any choice of (q, q¯) by construction. In fact, if there
exists n ≥ 2 banks, then this inequality is strict at equilibrium on HVWAP2 ∩HLOB2 , i.e.,
h ∈
(
r
α(1+r)n
(
1− r2(1+r)
)
, 2r
α(1+r)(n+1)
(
1
2 +
rn
(1+r)(n+1)
)
+ a
(
1
2 − 2rn(1+r)(n+1)
))
.
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In contrast, by construction of the order book density f , the borrowing by each firm at equi-
librium (and therefore total system wide borrowing) is greater under the VWAP framework than
the LOB framework, i.e., h− sVWAP (qVWAP , q¯VWAP )q¯VWAP ≤ h− sLOB(qLOB , q¯LOB)q¯LOB, with
strict ordering on the same interval as given above.
4.1.2 A counterexample to the symmetric ordering
In contrast to the symmetric system above, we now wish to consider a system in which the VWAP
setting results in fewer liquidations and more borrowing than the LOB framework. To do this, let’s
consider a simple heterogeneous n = 2 bank setting with r = 0.01, a = (1, 2), and h = (0.3, 1.2).
For this example consider the same order book density function f(s) = 1−αs and haircut function
g(s) = 12 − αs, but with the specific price impact parameter α = 0.05. With this construction, the
clearing liquidations and prices can be determined numerically to be
• sVWAP = (0, 0.4853) with qVWAP = 0.4757 and q¯VWAP = (0.9879, 0.9879).
• sLOB = (0.0990, 0.5080) with qLOB = 0.4696 and q¯LOB = (0.9950, 0.9828).
As desired at the beginning of this example, total liquidations are less for both banks (i.e., sVWAP <
sLOB), but borrowing by both banks has the opposite order (i.e., hi − sVWAPi q¯VWAPi > hi −
sLOBi q¯
LOB
i , i = 1, 2.). This is the opposite order from the symmetric case study considered above;
as such, there is no consistent order between the VWAP and LOB settings that can be determined.
4.1.3 Discussion
As shown in the prior two examples, there is no consistent ordering between the VWAP and LOB
settings. For symmetric systems and, more generally, systems close to symmetric, if the market
regulators wish to promote borrowing over liquidations, then the LOB framework is preferable;
however, for certain heterogeneous systems, the VWAP framework may be preferable to that same
regulator. As such, the use of stress testing of different market mechanisms is of the paramount
importance in order to determine the optimal market mechanism.
We wish to make one final consideration on the comparison of the VWAP and LOB frame-
works. We conjecture that the distinction between the two setting occurs only if some bank is both
liquidating and borrowing. Most prior works, e.g., Amini et al. [2016], consider only the situation
in which firms can only liquidate in order to cover their liabilities. Without borrowing allowed, the
VWAP and LOB frameworks will always coincide at the aggregate level. As such the mechanism
choice of f¯ is irrelevant when considered in the standard literature (which is written in a VWAP
style manner).
4.2 EBA case study
We conclude this work with a consideration of financial system calibrated to 2011 European banking
data. This stress test data has been utilized in numerous prior studies for studying interbank
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Figure 1: Summary statistics of the European banking sector’s response to a changing interest rate
environment.
liability networks (e.g., Gandy and Veraart [2016], Chen et al. [2016], Feinstein [2019]). We will
calibrate and utilize this EBA dataset in much the same way as in Bichuch and Feinstein [2019],
i.e., to have a more realistic system but one that still requires heuristics and, as such, is for
demonstration purposes only.
As a stylized bank balance sheet, we will consider two categories of assets: cash assets ci and
illiquid assets ai. We will additionally consider two categories of liabilities: external liabilities p¯i
and capital Ci. In order to determine these values, we calibrate the system as in Bichuch and
Feinstein [2019] but ignoring all interbank obligations considered as cash so as to discount default
contagion and focus solely on price-mediate contagion as discussed in the remainder of this work.
The total assets Ti and capital Ci are provided by this dataset directly for each bank i. The external
liabilities p¯i = Ti − Ci are computed by balance sheet construction. It remains to split the total
assets into cash and illiquid assets; we make this split according to the tier 1 capital ratio Ri, i.e.,
ci = RiTi and ai = (1−Ri)Ti.
In order to complete our model, we need to consider the remaining parameters of the system.
We set the market capitalization M =
∑n
i=1 ai to be the total number of shares of the illiquid
assets held by the banks. For this example we consider the linear order book density function
f(s) = 1 − αs and haircut function g(s) = 710 − αs for α = 1300M (i.e., a 0.30 euro haircut is
charged on top of the “market price” f(s)). By construction, this setting satisfies all conditions
of Theorem 3.6. We will focus on the impacts of altering the interest rate environment in order
to compare the VWAP and LOB settings. This is undertaken in the prevailing low interest rate
environment during the period from which this data is collected. For this study, no external shock
is applied to the financial system.
For our consideration, we compare the VWAP and LOB settings while varying the interest
rate environment. The results of varying the interest rate is displayed in Figure 1. As expected,
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total liquidations (Figure 1a) increase as the interest rate increases, whereas the total borrowing
(Figure 1b) is exactly the reverse of the total liquidations and, as such, is decreasing as the interest
rate increases. Notably, as discussed in the case studies of Section 4.1, under some interest rate
environments VWAP encourages more borrowing than LOB and vice versa under other interest
rate environments. We find that, system-wide, there is less selling and more borrowing in the LOB
setting for higher interest rates. Notably, the LOB setting results in a non-smooth response as a
function of the interest rate r. This results from the heterogeneous prices actualized by all banks;
due to these varying prices, each bank switches strategies at varying interest rates. This is in
contrast to the VWAP setting in which, though the banks are heterogeneous, the strategies of the
banks mostly overlap. With this notion, it becomes clear that LOB provides greater flexibility for
an intervention to control fire sales through the manipulation of interest rates.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have considered a model of a system of banks that need to raise funds to cover
their liquidity shortfalls. These firms decide on an optimal combination to raise the money through
borrowing in a repo market and selling an illiquid asset in a fire-sale, with both the haircut and the
fire-sale prices dependent on actions of other banks. We focused on two frameworks to determine
the fire-sale prices: the volume weighted average price and a notion of the limit order book in
order to capture notions of pricing dynamics in this, otherwise, static model. We found sufficient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in this game. Finally, we have
compared the VWAP and the LOB settings analytically when the banks are identical and perform
a numerical study using the 2011 EBA data.
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A Proofs of Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
In both the VWAP and LOB settings, for a fixed (q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) ∈ Q̂ the existence of an equilibrium s¯(q, q¯1, ..., q¯n)
follows along the same steps as the proof of Theorem 2.2. We next show the uniqueness of s¯(q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) by
utilizing the results of Rosen [1965] on convex games.
A.1.1 Volume weighted averaged price
Proof. In this case, the uniqueness of s¯(q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) follows from Bichuch and Feinstein [2019][Theorem 3.2],
as soon as we verify that the assumptions of that theorem hold.
Recall that f¯i is independent of the index i. Also, note that that we can write f¯i as a function of the
total liquidation s−i, where
s−i =
n∑
j 6=i,j=1
sj , (A.1)
f¯i(si, s−i) =: fˆ(si + s−i) =
1
si + s−i
∫ si+s−i
0
f(s)ds. (A.2)
We assume that f satisfies Assumption 3.1, and proceed to verify that Bichuch and Feinstein [2019] [As-
sumption 2.1] is also satisfied by fˆ . Indeed, fˆ ′(s) = − 1
s2
∫ s
0 f(u)du +
f(s)
s
≤ − sf(s)
s2
+ f(s)
s
= 0. It is also
easily seen that d
2
ds2
(sfˆ(s)) = f ′(s) < 0.
Lastly we need to show that fˆ ′′ ≥ 0. Calculate that s2fˆ ′′(s) = 2
s
∫ s
0 f(u)du − 2f(s) + sf ′(s). Since f is
convex, we have that f(s)−f(0) ≤ sf ′(s), and thus it is sufficient to show that 2
s
∫ s
0
f(u)du−f(0)−f(s) ≥ 0.
Using the fact that f is convex, we have that λf(s1)+(1−λ)f(s2) ≤ f(λs1+(1−λ)s2), λ ∈ [0, 1]. Integrating
over λ ∈ [0, 1] gives f(s1)+f(s2)2 ≤ 1s2−s1
∫ s2
s1
f(u)du, which gives the desired result.
A.1.2 Limit order book
Proof. Recall from Rosen [1965] that for s ∈ Rn, the function s 7→ H(s;ρ) is diagonally strictly convex, if for
some (fixed) ρ ∈ Rn+ and for every s0, s1 ∈ Rn, s0 6= s1, we have (s1 − s0)⊤γ(s0;ρ)− (s1 − s0)⊤γ(s1;ρ) < 0,
where
γ(s;ρ) =

∂s1H1(s; ρ1)
...
∂snHn(s; ρn)
 =

ρ1
(
1− (1 + r)f
(∑k1
ℓ=1(n− (ℓ − 1))(s[ℓ] − s[ℓ−1])
))
...
ρn
(
1− (1 + r)f
(∑kn
ℓ=1(n− (ℓ − 1))(s[ℓ] − s[ℓ−1])
))
 ,
where ki is such that s[ki] = si. Additionally, [Rosen, 1965, Theorem 6] shows that a sufficient condition for
H to be diagonally strictly convex is if Γ(s;ρ) + Γ(s;ρ)⊤ is a symmetric positive definite matrix for every
s ∈ Rn and some ρ ∈ Rn+, where Γ is the Jacobian matrix of γ with respect to s. Without loss of generality,
for fixed value s, assume ki = i for every bank.
Set ρi =
1
1+r then
[
Γ(s;ρ) + (Γ(s;ρ))⊤
]
ij
= −(1 + I{i=j}[2(n− i) + 1])f ′
(
i∨j−1∑
ℓ=1
sℓ + (n− (i ∨ j − 1))si∨j
)
.
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Thus, in full matrix notation, we find
Γ(s;ρ) + Γ(s;ρ)⊤ = A(s) +
n∑
j=1
Bj(s)
A(s) = − diag
(
[2(n− i) + 1]f ′
(
i−1∑
ℓ=1
sℓ + (n− (i− 1))si
))
Bj(s) =

[
f ′
(
j−1∑
ℓ=1
sℓ + (n− (j − 1))sj
)
− f ′
(
j∑
ℓ=1
sℓ + (n− j)sj+1
)] 1j×j 0j×(n−j)
0(n−j)×j 0(n−j)×(n−j)
 if j < n
−f ′ (∑nℓ=1 sℓ) 1n×n if j = n.
For any liquidations s, by construction, the matrix A(s) is positive definite and Bj(s) is positive semidefinite
(by nondecreasing property of f ′). The uniqueness of s¯(q, q¯1, ..., q¯n) follows from Rosen [1965][Theorem
2].
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Our goal is to apply Tarski’s fixed point theorem, to do which, we need to prove that
n∑
i=1
s¯i(q
↓, q¯↓) ≥
n∑
i=1
s¯i(q
↑, q¯↑), (A.3)
for (q↓, q¯↓) ≤ (q↑, q¯↑).
Proof. Recall the definitions of fˆ and s−i given in (A.2) and (A.1) respectively. Therefore, we can assume
that q¯ := q¯1 = ... = q¯n. First we note that for i = 1, ..., n
s¯i(q, q¯1n) =
ai if hi ≥ aiq¯,(hi−aiq
q¯−q
)+
∨
[
s0i (s¯−i(q, q¯1n)) ∧ hiq¯
]
if hi < aiq¯,
(A.4)
where s0i is the solution to
1− (1 + r)(fˆ (s0i + s¯−i(q, q¯1n)) + s0i fˆ ′(s0i + s¯−i(q, q¯1n))) = 0. (A.5)
With this construction we wish to note that bank i is defaulting and has no other option but to liquidate
all its assets if and only if hi ≥ aiq¯. Indeed, as noted previously in the body of this work, in the opposite
case hi < aiq¯, we have that:
1. hi
q¯
< ai if and only if hi < aiq¯.
2. hi−aiq
q¯−q < ai if and only if hi < aiq¯.
3. hi−aiq
q¯−q <
hi
q¯
if and only if hi < aiq¯.
Therefore, s¯i(q, q¯1n), i = 1, ..., n is well defined in (A.4), and s¯i(q, q¯) < ai in all those cases.
First consider the case when all banks keep at the same liquidation strategy, in other words the definition
of s¯i in (A.4) is equal to the same term (i.e., among ai,
hi
q¯
,
(
hi−aiq
q¯−q
)+
, and s0i ). Then for i = 1, ..., n:
• If s¯i = ai then ∂q s¯i, ∂q¯ s¯i = 0.
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• If s¯i = hiq¯ , then ∂q s¯i = 0, ∂q¯ s¯i < 0.
• If s¯i =
(
hi−aiq
q¯−q
)+
, first assume that hi ≥ aiq, in addition to hi < aiq¯. The former results in ∂q¯ s¯i ≤ 0,
while it follows from the latter that ∂qs¯i < 0. If, instead, hi < aiq then ∂q¯ s¯i = ∂q s¯i = 0. Note that we
have also used our assumption that q¯ > q.
• The last case to consider is when s¯i = s0i . This is the most interesting case because (s0i )′ ∈ (−1, 0]
as shown in Bichuch and Feinstein [2019][Theorem 3.2], therefore the derivative has the opposite sign
∂q¯s
0
i = (s
0
i )
′∂q¯s−i ≥ 0. This case, requires a more careful analysis as follows.
Let I0 be the set of banks j = 1, ..., n, such that s¯j = s
0
j , then differentiating (A.5) w.r.t. q¯, and using
the fact that (s0i )
′ ∈ (−1, 0], we see that
∂q¯s¯I0 = −(diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|)−1c
∑
j 6∈I0
∂q¯ s¯j ,
for some c ∈ [0, 1)|I0|. First, we wish to show that diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0| is invertible:
det
(
diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|
)
= det

1 ci1 · · · ci1
ci2 1 · · · ci2
...
...
. . .
...
ci|I0| ci|I0| · · · 1

= det

1 −(1− ci1) · · · −(1− ci1)
ci2 1− ci2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
ci|I0| 0 · · · 1− ci|I0|

=
1 + (1− ci1) ∑
i∈I0\{i1}
ci
1− ci
 ∏
i∈I0\{i1}
(1− ci)
=
(
1 + (1− ci1)
∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci − (1− ci1)
ci1
1− ci1
) ∏
i∈I0\{i1}
(1− ci)
=
(
1 +
∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci
) ∏
i∈I0
(1− ci),
where the 2nd line follows from subtracting the first column from every subsequent column and the
3rd line by using the Schur complement to determine the determinant. Thus we find that
det
(
diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|
)
=
(
1 +
∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci
)∏
i∈I0
(1 − ci) > 0.
Taking this all together:
n∑
i=1
∂q¯ s¯i =
∑
j 6∈I0
∂q¯∂s¯j − 1⊤|I0|(diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|)−1c
∑
j 6∈I0
∂q¯ s¯j
=
(
1− 1⊤|I0|(diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|)−1c
)∑
j 6∈I0
∂q¯ s¯j . (A.6)
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Moreover 1− 1⊤|I0|(diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|)−1c ≥ 0, since:
1⊤|I0|(diag(1|I0| − c) + c1⊤|I0|)−1c = 1⊤|I0|
(
diag(1|I0| − c)−1 −
diag(1|I0| − c)−1c1⊤|I0| diag(1|I0| − c)−1
1 + 1⊤|I0| diag(1|I0| − c)−1c
)
c
=
∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci −
1
1 +
∑
i∈I0
ci
1−ci
∑
i∈I0
∑
j∈I0
cicj
(1 − ci)(1 − cj)
=
1− 1
1 +
∑
i∈I0
ci
1−ci
∑
j∈I0
cj
1− cj
∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci
=
(
1 +
∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci
)−1∑
i∈I0
ci
1− ci ≤ 1,
where the first equality follows from the Sherman-Morrison matrix identity.
It now follows from (A.6) that
∑n
i=1 ∂q¯ s¯i ≤ 0, as desired. The same calculation also shows that∑n
i=1 ∂q s¯i ≤ 0, and therefore (A.3) holds.
Finally, in the case, that some banks may switch liquidation strategies, we use the fact that the map-
pings s¯i(·, ·), s0i (·) i = 1, ..., n are continuous. If there is a switch in strategies for bank i at some fixed
point q0, q¯0, then by continuity, of all the mappings in (A.4) it follows that both one sided derivatives∑n
i=1 ∂
+
q¯0 s¯i,
∑n
i=1 ∂
−
q¯0 s¯i ≤ 0. Therefore
∑n
i=1 s¯i is decreasing in q¯. Similar result also holds for q. We
conclude that (A.3) holds.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.6
To show uniqueness, we consider the equilibrium prices, as a mapping of (q∗, q¯∗) to liquidating positions of
banks s¯(q∗, q¯∗), and then to the resulting prices, and show the uniqueness of a fixed point to this mapping.
To simplify notation throughout this proof, let Qi, i ∈ {1, n}, denote the set of attainable prices. The case
of VWAP corresponds to i = 1 and Q1 :=
{
(g(s), fˆ(s)) | s ∈ [0,M ]
}
and the case of LOB corresponds to
i = 1, and Qn :=
{
(g(
∑n
i=1 si), f¯1(s), ..., fn(s)) | s ∈ D
}
. Moreover, for convenience define
I0 :=
{
i ∈ {1, ..., n} | s¯i = s0i
}
, IU :=
{
i ∈ {1, ..., n} | s¯i = hi
q¯i
}
, (A.7)
Ia := {i ∈ {1, ..., n} | s¯i = ai} , IL :=
{
i ∈ {1, ..., n} | s¯i =
(
hi − aiq
q¯i − q
)+}
. (A.8)
As before, we divide the proof into the VWAP and LOB cases:
A.3.1 Volume weighted average price
Proof. We first fix q¯ = fˆ(s), q = g(s) for some s ∈ [0,M ] (recall the definition of fˆ from (A.2)) and look
for an equilibrium s¯i(q, q¯1n) = s
∗
i (
∑
j 6=i s¯j(q, q¯1n), q, q¯1n) for all i = 1, ..., n. That is for the modified Nash
equilibrium given by (2.2) and formulated explicitly in (A.4).
The next goal is to show (q, q¯) 7→ (Φ(q, q¯), Φ¯(q, q¯)) = (g(∑nj=1 s¯j(q, q¯1n)), fˆ(∑nj=1 s¯j(q, q¯1n))), is a
contraction mapping. That is, our goal is to show that
∣∣Φ¯(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯(q2, q¯2)∣∣ ≤ L¯ ∥∥(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)∥∥
∞
,
and
∣∣Φ(q1, q¯1)− Φ(q2, q¯2)∣∣ ≤ L ∥∥(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)∥∥
∞
with L, L¯ < 1 for any attainable set of prices (q1, q¯1),
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(q2, q¯2) ∈ Q1. Without loss of generality, for this proof we will assume q1 ≤ q2; therefore (q1, q¯2) ∈ Q̂ as
well.
Indeed, with the convention that 0/0 = 0:∣∣Φ¯(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯(q2, q¯2)∣∣
‖(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)‖∞
≤
∣∣Φ¯(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯(q1, q¯2)∣∣
‖(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)‖∞
+
∣∣Φ¯(q1, q¯2)− Φ¯(q2, q¯2)∣∣
‖(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)‖∞
≤
∣∣Φ¯(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯(q1, q¯2)∣∣
|q¯1 − q¯2| +
∣∣Φ¯(q1, q¯2)− Φ¯(q2, q¯2)∣∣
|q1 − q2|
=
1
|q¯1 − q¯2|
∣∣∣∣∣∣fˆ
 n∑
j=1
s¯j(q
1, q¯11n)
− fˆ
 n∑
j=1
s¯j(q
1, q¯21n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
|q1 − q2|
∣∣∣∣∣∣fˆ
 n∑
j=1
s¯j(q
1, q¯21n)
− fˆ
 n∑
j=1
s¯j(q
2, q¯21n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ −fˆ ′(0)
 max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂q¯ s¯j(q, q¯1n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ + max(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂q s¯j(q, q¯1n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 . (A.9)
Similarly for Φ(q, q¯). Thus to be a contraction mapping, it is sufficient to show that
−fˆ ′(0)
 max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂q¯s¯j(q, q¯1n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ + max(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂q s¯j(q, q¯1n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 < 1,
−g′(0)
 max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂q¯s¯j(q, q¯1n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ + max(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
j=1
∂q s¯j(q, q¯1n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 < 1.
In order to show this, consider the sensitivity of s¯(q, q¯1n) with respect to q, q¯. Recall the construc-
tion of s¯ given by (A.4). Recall the definitions of IU , IL, I0 from (A.7) and (A.8). Assume that ai,
hi
q¯
,
s0i (
∑
j 6=i s¯j(q, q¯1n)),
hi−aiq
q¯−q are all different for all i = 1, ..., n, so that together with the continuity of s
0 it
follows that s¯ is differentiable with respect to q, q¯ and its derivatives for a given bank i are given by
∂q¯s¯i(q, q¯1n) =
(
− I{i∈IU}
hi
q¯2
− I{i∈IL}
hi − aiq
(q¯ − q)2 + (s
0
i )
′(
∑
j 6=i
s¯j(q, q¯1n))(
∑
j 6=i
∂q¯s¯j(q, q¯1n))I{i∈I0}
)
,
∂qs¯i(q, q¯1n) =
(
I{i∈IL}
hi − aiq¯
(q¯ − q)2 + (s
0
i )
′(
∑
j 6=i
s¯j(q, q¯1n))(
∑
j 6=i
∂q s¯j(q, q¯1n))I{i∈I0}
)
. (A.10)
Here, the derivative of the optimal liquidations (s0i (s−i)) can be found via implicit differentiation: (s
0
i )
′(s−i) =
− fˆ ′(s−i+s0i (s−i))+s0i (s−i)fˆ ′′(s−i+s0i (s−i))
2fˆ ′(s−i+s0i (s−i))+s
0
i
(s−i)fˆ ′′(s−i+s0i (s−i))
. Therefore (s0i )
′(s−i) ∈ (−1, 0] for all banks i such that s¯i = s0i if
fˆ ′(s) + sfˆ ′′(s) ≤ 0 for every s ∈ [0,M ].
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Solving the system (A.10), it follows that
∂q¯ s¯(q, q¯)
= −
I − diag
(s0i )′(∑
j 6=i
s¯j(q, q¯1n))(
∑
j 6=i
∂q¯ s¯j(q, q¯1n))I{i∈I0}

i=1,...,n
 (1n×n − I)
−1
×
(
diag
([
I{i∈IU}
]
i=1,...,n
) h
q¯2
+ diag
([
I{i∈IL}
]
i=1,...,n
) h− qa
(q¯ − q)2
)
,
∂q s¯(q, q¯)
=
I − diag
(s0i )′(∑
j 6=i
s¯j(q, q¯1n))(
∑
j 6=i
∂q s¯j(q, q¯1n))Ii∈I0}

i=1,...,n
 (1n×n − I)
−1
× diag
([
Ii∈IL}
]
i=1,...,n
) h− q¯a
(q¯ − q)2 .
Using the fact that (s0i )
′(s−i) ∈ (−1, 0] for i = 1, ..., n as follows from the sufficient assumption of the
theorem, it thus follows that
∣∣1⊤n ∂q¯ s¯(q, q¯)∣∣
≤ max
d∈[0,1)n
∣∣∣∣1⊤n (I + diag(d)(1n×n − I))−1 (diag([I{di=0,i∈IU}]i=1,...,n) hq¯2 + diag([I{di=0,i∈IL}]i=1,...,n) h− qa(q¯ − q)2
)∣∣∣∣ .
To compute this maximum, let B(d) := I + diag(d)(1n×n − I) = diag (1n − d) + d1⊤n . By the Sherman-
Morrison formula B(d)−1 = diag (1n − d)−1 − 11+1⊤n diag(1n−d)−1d diag (1n − d)
−1
d1⊤n diag (1n − d)−1. It
now follows that for any j = 1, ..., n
n∑
i=1
(
B(d)−1
)
ij
I{dj=0} =
1
1 +
∑n
k=1
dk
1−dk
1 + n∑
k=1
dk
1− dk −
∑
k 6=j
dk
1− dk
 I{dj=0} = I{dj=0}
1 +
∑n
k=1
dk
1−dk
.
Together with Remark 1 we conclude that
max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣1⊤n ∂q¯ s¯(q, q¯)∣∣ ≤ max
(q,q¯)∈Q1,d∈[0,1)n
∣∣∣∣∣1⊤nB(d)−1 (A.11)
×
(
diag
([
I{di=0,i∈IU}
]
i=1,...,n
) h
q¯2
+ diag
([
I{di=0,i∈IL}
]
i=1,...,n
) h− qa
(q¯ − q)2
) ∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
q¯∈[fˆ(M),1]
∣∣∣∣∣1⊤n
h
q¯
∧ a
q¯
∣∣∣∣∣+ max(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣1⊤n
h−qa
q¯−q ∧ a
q¯ − q
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxq¯∈[fˆ(M),1]
∑n
i=1 ai
q¯
+ max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∑n
i=1 ai
q¯ − q
≤ M
fˆ(M)
+
M
mins∈[0,M ]
(
fˆ(s)− g(s)
) .
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Similarly,
max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣1⊤n ∂q s¯(q, q¯)∣∣ ≤ max
(q,q¯)∈Q1,d∈[0,1)n
∣∣∣∣∣1⊤nB(d)−1 diag([I{di=0,i∈IL}]i=1,...,n) h− q¯a(q¯ − q)2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
(q,q¯)∈Q1
∣∣∣∣∣1⊤n
h−q¯a
q¯−q
q¯ − q
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max(q,q¯)∈Q1
∑n
i=1 ai
q¯ − q ≤
M
mins∈[0,M ]
(
fˆ(s)− g(s)
) ,
where in the last inequality we have used that fact that ai ≥ hi−aiqq¯−q ≥ hi−aiq¯q¯−q = −ai+ hi−aiqq¯−q ≥ −ai. Recalling
(A.9), we conclude that (Φ, Φ¯) is a contraction mapping if −3M(fˆ ′(0) ∧ g¯′(0)) < mins∈[0,M ]
(
fˆ(s)− g(s)
)
.
Finally, it can be seen that fˆ ′(s) = f(s)−fˆ(s)
s
. Therefore, fˆ ′(0) = 12f
′(0).
Recall that it was assumed that ai,
hi
q¯
, hi−aiq
q¯−q , s
0
i (
∑
j 6=i s¯j(q, q¯1n)) are all different. If this assumption is
violated, say s0i (
∑
j 6=i s¯j(q, q¯1n)) <
hi−aiq
q¯−q =
hi
q¯
, then we need to consider one-sided derivatives. In that case,
the derivative from the right ∂q¯+s¯i(q, q¯1n) = − hq¯2 , while the derivative from the left ∂q¯−s¯i(q, q¯1n) = −hi−aiq(q¯−q)2 .
In this case, both one-sided derivatives would satisfy (A.11). The other cases, can be treated similarly.
A.3.2 Limit order book
Proof. We first fix q¯ = f¯(s), q = g(
∑n
i=1 si) for some s ∈ D and look for an equilibrium s¯i(q, q¯) =
s∗i (s¯−i(q, q¯), q, q¯) which is explicitly provided by
s¯i(q, q¯) =
ai if hi ≥ aiq¯i(hi−aiq
q¯i−q
)+
∨
[
s0i (s¯−i(q, q¯)) ∧ hiq¯i
]
if hi < aiq¯i
(A.12)
where s0i (s¯−i) solves the first order condition
1− (1 + r)f
 n∑
j=1
I{s¯j<si}s¯j + (n− (ki − 1))si
 = 0, (A.13)
where we recall that ki is such that s[ki] = si. For simplicity, we will continue to assume that q1 ≥ q2 ≥ ... ≥
qn.
The next goal is to show (q, q¯) 7→ (Φ(q, q¯), Φ¯(q, q¯)) = (g(∑nj=1 s¯j(q, q¯)), f¯1(s¯(q, q¯))) is a contraction map-
ping, i.e., to show that
∥∥Φ¯(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯(q2, q¯2)∥∥
∞
≤ L¯
∥∥(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)∥∥
∞
and
∣∣Φ(q1, q¯1)− Φ(q2, q¯2)∣∣ ≤
L
∥∥(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)∥∥
∞
with L, L¯ < 1 for any (q1, q¯1), (q2, q¯2) ∈ Qn. Without loss of generality, for this
proof we will assume q1 ≤ q2; therefore (q1, q¯2) ∈ Q̂.
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Indeed, with the convention that 0/0 = 0, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n:∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯j(q2, q¯2)∣∣
‖(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)‖∞
≤
∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯1)− Φ¯j(q1, q¯2)∣∣
‖(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)‖∞
+
∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯2)− Φ¯j(q2, q¯2)∣∣
‖(q1, q¯1)− (q2, q¯2)‖∞
≤
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯2{1,...,k−1}, q¯1{k,...,n})− Φ¯j(q1, q¯2{1,...,k}, q¯1{k+1,...,n})∣∣∣
‖q¯1 − q¯2‖∞
+
∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯2)− Φ¯j(q2, q¯2)∣∣
|q1 − q2|
≤
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯2{1,...,k−1}, q¯1{k,...,n})− Φ¯j(q1, q¯2{1,...,k}, q¯1{k+1,...,n})∣∣∣
|q¯1k − q¯2k|
+
∣∣Φ¯j(q1, q¯2)− Φ¯j(q2, q¯2)∣∣
|q1 − q2|
=
n∑
k=1
1
|q¯1k − q¯2k|
∣∣∣f¯j (s¯(q1, q¯2{1,...,k−1}, q¯1{k,...,n}))− f¯j (s¯(q1, q¯2{1,...,k}, q¯1{k+1,...,n}))∣∣∣
+
1
|q1 − q2|
∣∣f¯j (s¯(q1, q¯2))− f¯j (s¯(q2, q¯2))∣∣
≤
n∑
k=1
max
(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂si f¯j(0n)∂q¯k s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣+ max(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂si f¯j(0n)∂q s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Similarly for Φ(q, q¯). Thus to be a contraction mapping, it is sufficient to show that for every j = 1, ..., n
n∑
k=1
max
(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂si f¯j(0n)∂q¯k s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣+ max(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂si f¯j(0n)∂q s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1, (A.14)
−g′(0)
(
n∑
k=1
max
(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂q¯k s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣ − max(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂qs¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
< 1.
In order to show this, consider the sensitivity of s¯(q, q¯) with respect to q, q¯. Recall again the definitions
of IU , IL, I0 from (A.7) and (A.8). Assume that ai,
hi
q¯i
, s0i (s¯−i(q, q¯)),
hi−aiq
q¯i−q
are all different for all i = 1, ..., n.
Note that for different i, some of these quantities may be equal, namely, we must have s0i = s
0
j , since if there
is a solution s0, it is unique. Similar to the proof in Section A.3.1, otherwise, one sided derivatives can be
considered. Together with the continuity of s0 it follows that s¯i is differentiable with respect to q, q¯ and its
derivatives for a given bank i are given by
∂q¯k s¯i(q, q¯) =
(
− I{i=k,i∈IU }
hi
q¯2i
− I{i=k,i∈IL}
hi − aiq
(q¯i − q)2 +∇s
0
i (s¯−i(q, q¯)) ·
[
∂q¯k s¯j(q, q¯)I{s¯j<s0i }
]
j=1,...,n,j 6=i
I{i∈I0}
)
,
∂q s¯i(q, q¯) =
(
I{i∈IL}
hi − aiq¯i
(q¯i − q)2 +∇s
0
i (s¯−i(q, q¯)) · ∂q s¯−i(q, q¯)I{i∈I0}
)
.
Here, the derivative of the optimal liquidations (s0k(s−i)) can be found via implicit differentiation of 1− (1+
r)f
(∑n
j=1 I{s¯j<s0i }
s¯j + (n− ki+1)si
)
= 0 to be ∂sjs
0
i (s−i) = −
I
{s¯j<s
0
i
}
n−(ki−1)
. Set q¯′ = minj,k ∂sk f¯j(0n) < 0. Sim-
ilarly to before, we have that ∂sk f¯j(0n) =
1
2f
′(0n)I{1≤k≤j}. Recall that
hi
q¯2
i
, hi−aiq(q¯i−q)2≤
ai
mins∈D(f¯j(s)−g(
∑
n
i=1 si))
.
Thus, for any i0 ∈ I0, we have that
∑
i∈I0
∂q¯j s¯i(q, q¯) > −I{s¯j<s0i0}
∑
k∈{k : s¯k<s0i0
}
ak
mins∈D(f¯j(s)−g(
∑
n
i=1
si))
, for
j = 1, ..., n. Therefore,
∣∣∑m
k=l ∂q¯j s¯k(q, q¯)
∣∣ ≤ ∑
k∈{k : s¯k 6=s0i0
}
ak
mins∈D(f¯j(s)−g(
∑
n
i=1
si))
≤ M
mins∈D(f¯j(s)−g(
∑
n
i=1
si))
,
for any 1 ≤ l ≤ m ≤ n.
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We conclude that for any j = 1, ..., n, we have that
n∑
k=1
max
(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂si f¯j(0n)∂q¯k s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |q¯′| nMmins∈D (f¯j(s)− g(∑ni=1 si)) .
Similarly, since |∑ni=1 ∂q s¯i(q, q¯)| ≤ Mmins∈D,m(f¯m(s)−g(∑ni=1 si)) , we get that
max
(q,q¯)∈Qn
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
∂si f¯j(0n)∂q s¯i(q, q¯)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |q¯′| Mmins∈D (f¯j(s)− g(∑ni=1 si)) .
Recalling (A.14) we conclude that Φ¯ is a contraction mapping if
−nM min
j,k
∂sk f¯j(0n) < min
j
min
s∈D
(
f¯j(s)− g(
n∑
i=1
si)
)
.
Similar −nMg′(0) < minj mins∈D
(
f¯j(s)− g(
∑n
i=1 si)
)
ensures that Φ is a contraction mapping.
B Sensitivity of the clearing solutions to interest rates r
In this section we consider the assumptions of Theorem 3.6 with the goal of investigating the sensitivity of
the (unique) equilibrium to the interest rate r. To simplify notation, for this section we write s¯i := s¯i(q, q¯1n)
or s¯i := s¯i(q, q¯) where the values of (q, q¯) and (q, q¯) is clear from context for the VWAP and LOB settings
respectively. In the following, we derive ∂r s¯, the derivatives of the equilibrium liquidations w.r.t. r. We
then provide conditions under which the intuition of Remark 3 holds, i.e., the system-wide total liquidations
increase with increase of r.
B.1 Volume weighted average price
Initially, as in the prior proofs, assume that for each i = 1, ..., n, the possible solutions to the optimization
for s¯i from (A.4), namely ai,
hi
q¯
, hi−aiq
q¯−q , s
0
i (
∑
j 6=i s¯j), are all different. We want to study ∂r s¯i for i = 1, ..., n.
From the previous assumption it follows that
∂r s¯i =

0 if i ∈ Ia
−hi
q¯2
∂rq¯ if i ∈ IU(
hi−aiq¯
(q¯−q)2
)
∂rq −
(
hi−aiq
(q¯−q)2
)
∂r q¯ if i ∈ IL
∂rs
0
i if i ∈ I0
where Ia, IU , IL, I0 were defined in (A.7) and (A.8).
Before continuing, we will consider ∂r s¯i for i ∈ I0. By construction, we have
− (fˆ(s0i +
∑
j 6=i
s¯j) + s
0
i fˆ
′(s0i +
∑
j 6=i
s¯j))− (1 + r)(2fˆ ′(s0i +
∑
j 6=i
s¯j) + s
0
i fˆ
′′(s0i +
∑
j 6=i
s¯j))∂r s¯i
− (1 + r)
∑
j 6=i
(fˆ ′(s0i +
∑
j 6=i
s¯j) + s
0
i fˆ
′′(s0i +
∑
j 6=i
s¯j))∂r s¯j = 0.
26
Recall that every bank i ∈ I0 will satisfy the same condition, i.e., ∂r s¯i = ∂r s¯j for every i, j ∈ I0. For nota-
tional simplicity let s0 = s0i , ∂rs
0 = ∂rs
0
i for arbitrary i ∈ I0. Let c =
fˆ ′(|I0|s
0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)+s
0fˆ ′′(|I0|s
0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)
2fˆ ′(|I0|s0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)+s0fˆ ′′(|I0|s0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)
and d = − fˆ(|I0|s
0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)+s
0fˆ ′(|I0|s
0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)
(1+r)(2fˆ ′(|I0|s0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j)+s0fˆ ′′(|I0|s0+
∑
j 6∈I0
s¯j))
. Recall that by our Assumption 2.1, 0 ≤ c < 1 and
d > 0. Therefore, it can be shown that
∂rs
0 =
d
1 + c(|I0| − 1) −
c
1 + c(|I0| − 1)
∑
j 6∈I0
∂r s¯j .
We can now consider the joint sensitivity of the haircut q and price q¯ to interest rates:
∂rq =
∑
i∈I0
∂rs
0 +
∑
i6∈I0
∂r s¯i
 g′( n∑
i=1
s¯i)
=
 |I0|d
1 + c(|I0| − 1) +
1− c
1 + c(|I0| − 1)
∑
j 6∈I0
∂r s¯i
 g′( n∑
i=1
s¯i)
∂r q¯ =
∑
i∈I0
∂rs
0 +
∑
i6∈I0
∂r s¯i
 fˆ ′( n∑
i=1
s¯i)
=
 |I0|d
1 + c(|I0| − 1) +
1− c
1 + c(|I0| − 1)
∑
j 6∈I0
∂r s¯i
 fˆ ′( n∑
i=1
s¯i).
To simplify notation, let c˜ = 1−c1+c(|I0|−1) and d˜ =
|I0|d
1+c(|I0|−1)
. Therefore
∂rq =
[
d˜+ c˜
(
h− aq¯
(q¯ − q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i −
h
q¯2
)
∂rq − c˜
(
h− aq
(q¯ − q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i[I{i∈IU}]i
)
∂rq¯
]
g′(
n∑
i=1
s¯i),
∂r q¯ =
[
d˜+ c˜
(
h− aq¯
(q¯ − q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i −
h
q¯2
)
∂rq − c˜
(
h− aq
(q¯ − q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i[I{i∈IU}]i
)
∂rq¯
]
fˆ ′(
n∑
i=1
s¯i).
That is, the sensitivity of the haircut and prices (q, q¯) w.r.t. the interest rate r is the solution of a linear
system(
∂rq
∂r q¯
)
= [I −W ]−1
(
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)d˜
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
)
=
I +
(
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
)(
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i −
[
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
] )
c˜
1− c˜
[(
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i
)
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)−
(
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
]

×
(
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)d˜
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
)
,
W =
(
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
)(
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i −
[
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
] )
c˜.
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Moreover, it also follows that
∂r
n∑
i=1
s¯i =
∂rq
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
= 1 +
c˜
((
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i
)
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)−
(
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
)
1− c˜
[(
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i
)
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)−
(
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
]
=
1
1− c˜
[(
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i
)
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)−
(
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
] .
It follows that ∂r
∑n
i=1 s¯i > 0 if
(
h−aq¯
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i
)
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)−
(
h−aq
(q¯−q)2 [I{i∈IL}]i +
h
q¯2
[I{i∈IU}]i
)
fˆ ′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i) <
1
c˜
, which happens if, for example, fˆ ′ is small enough.
B.2 Limit order book
Initially, again assume that for each i = 1, ..., n, the possible solutions (ai,
hi
q¯i
, hi−aiq
q¯i−q
, s0i (
∑
j 6=i s¯j)) to the
optimization (A.12) are all different. As in the VWAP case, we want to study ∂rs¯i for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. From
the previous assumption it follows that
∂r s¯i =

0 if i ∈ Ia,
−hi
q¯2
i
∂r q¯i if i ∈ IU ,(
hi−aiq¯i
(q¯i−q)2
)
∂rq −
(
hi−aiq
(q¯i−q)2
)
∂r q¯i if i ∈ IL,
∂rs
0
i if i ∈ I0,
where Ia, IU , IL, I0 were defined in (A.7) and (A.8).
Recall s0i (s¯−i) solves the first order condition
1− (1 + r)f
 n∑
j=1
I{s¯j<si}s¯j + (n− (ki − 1))si
 = 0,
where ki is such that s[ki] = si. As noted in the proof of Theorem 3.6 in the LOB case, we have that s¯i = s
0
i
is unique, and independent of i. In fact, s0i = s
0
j for every i, j ∈ I0. We will denote this common value as s0.
If s¯i = s
0 then from implicit differentiation of (A.13), we get that
∂rs
0 = −
f
(∑n
j=1 I{s¯j<s0}s¯j + (n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1))s0
)
(1 + r)f ′
(∑n
j=1 I{s¯j<s0}s¯j + (n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1))s0
)
(n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1))
−
∑
i∈IU
∂r s¯i
n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1) .
Now we want to consider the case of ∂r s¯i for i ∈ IU . Notably, s¯i < s0 for i ∈ IU by construction (see
(A.12)). Therefore for such banks, there is no change to the attained prices q¯i by a change in the interest
rate, i.e., ∂r q¯i = 0 for i ∈ IU . This allows us to simplify ∂rs0.
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We can now consider the joint sensitivity of the haircut q and prices q¯ to interest rates:
∂rq =
[ ∑
i∈I0∪IL
∂r s¯i
]
g′(
n∑
i=1
s¯i)
=
− |I0|f
(∑n
j=1 I{s¯j<s0}s¯j + (n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1))s0
)
(1 + r)f ′
(∑n
j=1 I{s¯j<s0}s¯j + (n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1))s0
)
(n− (|I0 ∪ IL| − 1))
+
∑
i∈IL
∂r s¯i
 g′( n∑
i=1
s¯i),
∂r q¯i =

0 if i ∈ Ia ∪ IU ,
− f
(∑
n
j=1 I{s¯j<s
0}s¯j+(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))s
0
)
(1+r)f ′
(∑
n
j=1 I{s¯j<s
0}s¯j+(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))s
0
)
(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))
∂si f¯i(s¯) if i ∈ I0,
− |I0|f
(∑
n
j=1
I{s¯j<s
0}s¯j+(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))s
0
)
(1+r)f ′
(∑
n
j=1
I{s¯j<s
0}s¯j+(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))s
0
)
(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))
∂si0 f¯i(s¯) +
∑
j∈IL
s¯j≤s¯i
(∂r s¯j) ∂sj f¯i(s¯) if i ∈ IL,
for arbitrary i0 ∈ I0.
To simplify notation, let c˜ = − f
(∑
n
j=1
I{s¯j<s
0}s¯j+(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))s
0
)
(1+r)f ′
(∑
n
j=1
I{s¯j<s
0}s¯j+(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))s
0
)
(n−(|I0∪IL|−1))
. It then follows
that (
∂rq¯
∂rq
)
=W−1b,
where
W = (wi,j)1≤i,j≤n+1,
b = (bi)i=1,...,n+1,
wi,j = I{i=j<n+1} + I{i,j∈IL ,s¯i≥s¯j}
hj − ajqj
(q¯j − q)2
∂sj f¯i(s¯)− I{i∈IL,j=n+1}
∑
k∈IL,s¯k≤s¯i
hk − ak q¯k
(q¯k − q)2
∂sk f¯i(s¯),
wn+1,j = I{j∈IL}
hj − ajq
(q¯j − q)2
g′ + I{j=n+1}
(
1− g′
∑
i∈IL
hi − aiq
(q¯i − q)2
)
,
bi = c˜∂si f¯i(s¯)I{i∈I0} + |I0| c˜∂si0 f¯i(s¯)I{i∈IL} + |I0|c˜g′I{i=n+1}.
We note, without loss of generality, that if we assume that for any i ∈ Ia, j ∈ IU , k ∈ I0, l ∈ IL, we have
that i < j < k < l, and that for any i, j ∈ IL, such that i < j then s¯i ≤ s¯j , we then have that W is lower
triangular, but has an addition of one full n + 1 column. W is invertible, and we can find its inverse as
follows: Note that W can be written as
W =
W0 + (0, 0, ..., 0, 1)⊤
[
I{j∈IL}
hj − ajq
(q¯j − q)2
g′ − I{j=n+1}g′
∑
i∈IL
hi − aiq
(q¯i − q)2
]
j=1,...,n+1
⊤ ,
where W0 = D (I +N) with
D = diag
[1 + I{j∈IL} hj − ajqj
(q¯j − q)2
∂sj f¯j(s¯)
]
j=1,...,n

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is a diagonal matrix and a nilpotent matrix
N =
(I{i,j∈IL,s¯i>s¯j}hj − ajqj
(q¯j − q)2
∂sj f¯i(s¯)
)
j,i

1≤i,j≤n+1
.
Note that N is such that Nn+1 = 0. Therefore, we have that
W−10 = (I +N)
−1
D−1 =
(
I −N+N2 + ...+ (−1)nNn)D−1.
Finally,
W−1 =
W−10 − W
−1
0 (0, 0, ..., 0, 1)
⊤
[
I{j∈IL}
hj−ajq
(q¯j−q)
2 g′ − I{j=n+1}g′
∑
i∈IL
hi−aiq
(q¯i−q)
2
]
j=1,...,n+1
W−10
1 +
[
I{j∈IL}
hj−ajq
(q¯j−q)
2 g′ − I{j=n+1}g′
∑
i∈IL
hi−aiq
(q¯i−q)
2
]
j=1,...,n+1
W−10 (0, 0, ..., 0, 1)
⊤

⊤
.
To calculate ∂r
∑n
i=1 s¯i, recall that ∂r q¯i = 0 for i ∈ IU , and from (B.2) it follows that
∂r
n∑
i=1
s¯i =
∑
i∈I0∪IL
∂r s¯i =
∂rq
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
=
(0, 0, ..., 0, 1)⊤W−1b
g′(
∑n
i=1 s¯i)
.
It follows that ∂r
∑n
i=1 s¯i ≥ 0 if (0, 0, ..., 0, 1)⊤W−1b ≤ 0.
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